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Multilateral Resistance to Migration
* 
 
The rate of migration observed between two countries does not depend solely on their 
relative attractiveness, but also on the one of alternative destinations. Following the trade 
literature, we term the influence exerted by other destinations on bilateral flows as Multilateral 
Resistance to Migration, and we show how it can be accounted for when estimating the 
determinants of migration flows in the context of a general individual random utility 
maximization model. We propose the use of the Common Correlated Effects estimator 
(Pesaran, 2006) and apply it to high-frequency data on the Spanish immigration boom 
between 1997 and 2009. Compared to more restrictive estimation strategies developed in the 
literature, the bias goes in the expected direction: we find a smaller effect of GDP per capita 
and a larger effect of migration policies on bilateral flows. 
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The responsiveness of the scale of migration ows to varying economic conditions - both in
sending and recipient countries - and to changing immigration policies at destination repre-
sents a central topic in the international migration literature. While some recent contribu-
tions have provided econometric analysis of aggregate data where the identication strategy
is consistent with the proposed underlying individual-level migration decision model (Beine,
Docquier, and Ozden, 2011; Grogger and Hanson, 2011; Ortega and Peri, 2009),1 others have
relied on econometric specications that have not been fully micro-founded (Clark, Hatton,
and Williamson, 2007; Pedersen, Pytlikova, and Smith, 2008; Mayda, 2010; Theoharides,
McKenzie, and Yang, 2010).
This methodological dierence notwithstanding, these papers share a crucial feature,
as Hanson (2010) observes that the literature is characterized by a long-standing tradition
of \estimating bilateral migration ows as a function of characteristics in the source and
destination countries only". Still, would-be migrants sort themselves across alternative des-
tinations, so that it is important to understand whether this econometric approach allows
to control for the possible dependence of the migration rate between any pair of countries
upon the time-varying attractiveness of other migrants' destinations. Hanson (2010) argues
that \failing to control other migration opportunities could [...] produce biased estimates",
and this issue resembles the one raised by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) with respect
to the estimation of the determinants of bilateral trade ows.
Trade between two countries does not depend on bilateral trade costs only, but rather on
the relationship between these costs and the costs with the other trading partners; Anderson
and van Wincoop (2004) refer to the attractiveness of trading with other partners as mul-
tilateral resistance to trade.2 Similarly, migration ows between a dyad represented by an
origin and a destination country do not depend solely on the attractiveness of the latter, but
also on how this relates to the opportunities to move to other destinations. Following the
terminology introduced by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), we refer to the attractiveness
of other destinations as Multilateral Resistance to Migration.
1Bertoli, Fern andez-Huertas Moraga, and Ortega (2010) analyze the income-sensitivity of international
migration ows using individual-level data.
2Baldwin (2006) observes that this is nothing more than a specic case of the general principle that
\relative prices matter".
2This paper directly addresses the concern raised by Hanson (2010). First, it relates the
stochastic properties of the underlying individual migration decision model to the need to
control for multilateral resistance to migration when estimating the determinants of bilateral
migration ows. Second, it shows that the data usually employed in the literature suce to
obtain consistent estimates even when multilateral resistance to migration matters. Third, it
applies the proposed econometric approach - which draws on Pesaran (2006) - to analyze the
determinants of migration ows to Spain over 1997-2009 using high-frequency administrative
data.
The paper presents a general random utility maximization (RUM) model that describes
the migration decision problem that individuals face. The theoretical model shows that
multilateral resistance to migration represents an issue for the analysis of aggregate data
whenever the stochastic component of location-specic utility is such that the independence
of irrelevant alternatives assumption fails.3 The derivation of the econometric specication
from the random utility maximization model reveals that multilateral resistance to migration,
which is unobservable for the econometrician, gives rise to an endogeneity problem, as the
regressors are correlated with the error term, which also exhibits serial and spatial correlation.
We show that the multilateral resistance to migration term entering the error of the
equation that describes the determinants of aggregate migration ows on the basis of the
RUM model can be expressed as the inner product of a vector of dyad-specic factor loadings
and a vector of time-specic common eects. This entails that the structure of the error
term coincides with the multifactor error model presented in Pesaran (2006). Pesaran (2006)
proposed an estimator, the Common Correlated Eects (CCE) estimator, which allows to
derive consistent estimates from panel data when the error follows this structure, i.e. it is
serially and spatially correlated, and the regressors are endogenous.4 The CCE estimator
requires to estimate a regression where the cross-sectional averages of the dependent and of
all the independent variables are included as auxiliary regressors: consistency of the estimates
follows from the fact that the multilateral resistance to migration term can be approximated
3The converse is also true: if the independence of irrelevant alternatives characterizes the individual
migration decision problem, then the time-varying attractiveness of other destinations can be disregarded in
the econometric analysis, as in Grogger and Hanson (2011) and Beine, Docquier, and Ozden (2011).
4Driscoll and Kraay (1998) allow to address the violation of the classical assumptions on the error term,
but still require exogeneity of the regressors, which does not hold when multilateral resistance to migration
is an issue.
3by a dyad-specic linear combination of the cross-sectional averages (Pesaran, 2006).
The adoption of the CCE estimator allows us to address the challenge posed by multi-
lateral resistance to migration using the same data that are traditionally employed in the
literature. This approach is more general than the one proposed in Mayda (2010), who
includes a weighted average of income per capita in the other destinations as a control for
their time-varying attractiveness,5 and the one in Ortega and Peri (2009), which is valid only
under more restrictive assumptions on the underlying RUM model and which does not allow
to identify the eects of origin-specic variables.
The proposed econometric approach is applied to the analysis of the determinants of
bilateral migration ows to Spain between 1997 and 2009, when this country experienced
an unprecedented boom in immigration. In fact, Spain recorded \the highest rate of growth
of the foreign-born population over a short period observed in any OECD country since
the Second World War" (OECD, 2010): the immigrant share went from 3 percent of the
population in 1998 to 14 percent in 2009 (INE, 2010b).6 Migration data come from the
Estad stica de Variaciones Residenciales (EVR; (INE, 2010a)), an administrative dataset
collected by the Instituto Nacional de Estad stica. A key feature of the EVR is that it
provides us with high-frequency data, which give to the dataset the longitudinal dimension
that is required to be condent about the application of the CCE estimator (Pesaran, 2006).
The data from the EVR, which have been aggregated by quarter, have been combined
with data from IMF (2010a) and World Bank (2010) on real GDP and population at origin
for 61 countries,7 which represent 87 percent of the total ows to Spain over our period of
analysis. Furthermore, we have compiled information about the various facets of Spanish
immigration policies - such as bilateral visa waivers and agreements on the portability of
pension rights - which have been shown to be relevant determinants of recent immigration
to Spain (Bertoli, Fern andez-Huertas Moraga, and Ortega, 2011).
Our results show that ignoring the multilateral resistance to migration term biases the
estimation of the determinants of migration ows to Spain. In addition, the direction of the
5Hanson (2010) wonders whether this is \a sucient statistic for other migration opportunities". We
show that this is not the case in general.
6These gures can only be compared with Israel in the 1990s, when \immigration increased Israel's
population by 12 percent between 1990 and 1994, after emigration restrictions were lifted in an unstable
Soviet Union" (Friedberg, 2001), at a time when Israel had not joined the OECD yet.
7Data from the International Financial Statistics (IMF, 2010a) have been also combined with data from
the World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2010b), and various Central Banks, as described in the Appendix A.3.
4bias is the one we could expect. The eect of GDP at origin on migration ows to Spain is
two thirds of that found in a specication that does not control for multilateral resistance to
migration, although it is still negative and signicant: a 1 percent drop in GDP per capita in
a country increases its emigration rate to Spain by 3.1 percent. This bias is in the opposite
direction of that found on the impact of migration policies. The only migration policy that
has a signicant eect on migration ows to Spain is the adoption of a visa waiver. This
eect only turns signicant when the multilateral resistance to migration is accounted for:
establishing a visa waiver for a country multiplies its emigration rate to Spain by a factor of
4,8 while the estimated eect when multilateral resistance to migration is not controlled for
is not signicantly dierent from zero.
The paper is related to four strands of the literature. First, the papers that analyze the
determinants of bilateral migration ows using panel data in a multi-origin multi-destination
framework (Clark, Hatton, and Williamson, 2007; Lewer and den Berg, 2008; Grogger and
Hanson, 2011; Mayda, 2010; Ortega and Peri, 2009; Simpson and Sparber, 2010; Pedersen,
Pytlikova, and Smith, 2008; Beine, Docquier, and Ozden, 2011). Our theoretical model can
also be applied to that framework but, in terms of the structure of the data, our paper is
more closely related to Clark, Hatton, and Williamson (2007) and Theoharides, McKenzie,
and Yang (2010), which estimate the determinants of bilateral ows to one destination, the
United States, and from one origin, the Philippines, respectively.9
Second, we draw on the papers that have analyzed high-frequency migration data. Speci-
cally, Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) and Orrenius and Zavodny (2003) who analyze monthly
migration ows from Mexico to the United States.
Third, the theoretical and empirical analysis presented here is related to the papers in
the trade literature that discuss the relevance of multilateral resistance to trade (Anderson
and van Wincoop, 2003, 2004; Baldwin, 2006).
Fourth, the paper is related to the contributions in the econometric literature that present
estimators which allow to deal with violations on the classical assumption about the variance
8This huge eect is in line with the ndings of Bertoli, Fern andez-Huertas Moraga, and Ortega (2011)
for the case of Ecuadorian migration to Spain.
9The analysis is also related to the papers that estimate the inuence of demographic factors (Hanson and
McIntosh, 2010b,a) and migration networks (Edin, Fredriksson, and  Aslund, 2003; Munshi, 2003; McKenzie
and Rapoport, 2010; Bertoli, 2010) upon migration ows; these eects are controlled for but not estimated
in our paper.
5structure of the error term (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998; Hoechle, 2007; Coakley, Fuertes, and
Smith, 2002), and with the endogeneity of the regressors (Pesaran, 2006; Bai, 2009; Pesaran
and Tosetti, 2011).10
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the random utility maximization
model that represents the individual migration decision problem; Section 3 analyzes the
relationship between the stochastic properties of the RUM model and the need to control
for multilateral resistance to migration in the econometric analysis through the CCE esti-
mator proposed by Pesaran (2006). Section 4 presents the sources of the data used in the
econometric analysis and the descriptive statistics. Section 5 discusses the estimates, and the
empirical relevance of multilateral resistance to migration for the case that we have analyzed.
Finally, Section 6 draws the main conclusions.
2 From individual decisions to aggregate ows
We present here a random utility maximization model that describes the location choice
problem that would-be migrants face, which gives us the basis for deriving the determinants
of bilateral aggregate migration ows. To keep it as general as possible, we do not specify
the factors that inuence location-specic utility.
2.1 Random utility maximization model
Consider a set of individuals, indexed by i, originating from a country j belonging to a set H,
who have to chose their preferred location among countries belonging to the set Dj = D[fjg,
which contains n(j) elements. Let the elements in Dj be indexed by k; the utility that the
individual i from country j obtains from opting for country k is given by:
10Endogeneity of some of the regressors, such as GDP at origin, goes beyond the eect exerted by mul-
tilateral resistance to migration: Mishra (2007) and Docquier, Ozden, and Peri (2010) show how wages at
origin respond to migration whereas Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano and Peri (2010) among many others show
how wages at destination respond to migration, and Bugamelli and Patern o (2009) analyze the relationship
between migrants' remittances and current account reversals, and they conclude that remittances lower the
probability of such a reversal; Anderson (2011) explores the implications for the estimation strategy when
GDP is endogenous to migration ows.
6Uijk = Vjk + ijk = 
0xjk + ijk (1)
where xjk is a vector of factors - which can include location- or dyad-specic elements,11
and ijk is a stochastic term.
The vector pij = (pij1;:::;pijk;:::) which collects the choice probabilities for individual
i over all the countries belonging to the set Dj depends on the assumptions about the
distribution of the stochastic term in (1). We consider here distributions of ijk which can
be obtained from a Generalized Extreme Value generating function (McFadden, 1978), as
the econometric approaches adopted in the literature are all consistent with dierent GEV
models.
Consider a real-valued function G with domain Rn(j),12 and which takes as its arguments
the exponentiated values of the deterministic component in (1), i.e. Yjl = eVjl: if G satises
the four properties described in McFadden (1978),13 then G is a GEV generating function
and the element k in the vector of choice probabilities pij is equal to the elasticity of G with
respect to Yjk.14
A simplied version of the GEV generating function proposed by Wen and Koppelman
(2001) allows us to present in a unied framework various approaches that have been adopted
to estimate the determinants of bilateral migration ows, and the more general approach










where Yjl = eVjl for l 2 Dj and b are nests of Dj indexed by m. The matrix j collects
the allocation parameters jlm, which characterize the portion of country l which is assigned
to the nest bm for individuals from the origin country j,16 and , with  2 (0;1], is the
11Location-specic elements vary only over k, while dyad-specic elements vary over each pair (j;k).
12Observe that we omit the subscript j from the function G in (2) for the sake of simplicity.
13G is nonnegative and homogeneous of degree 1, it diverges to innity when one its argument diverges
to innity, the partial derivative with respect to any of its argument is nonnegative, and cross-derivatives
alternate their signs.
14See also Train (2003) for an introduction to GEV models.
15Wen and Koppelman (2001) demonstrate that G satises the four identifying properties in McFadden
(1978).
16The allocation parameters satisfy jlm 2 [0;1] for all l 2 Dj, and the sum of the elements in each row
vector jl is equal to 1.
7dissimilarity parameter for the nests bm.
The specication in (2) does not restrict individuals from dierent origin countries to
have identical preferences, as the allocation matrix j can vary across origins. This implies
that the stochastic component of utility can follow origin-specic patterns of correlation
across alternative destinations.17
When the GEV generating function is as in (2), the element k in the vector of choice












Wen and Koppelman (2001) refer to the discrete choice model whose choice probabilities
are described in (3) as the generalized nested logit model. The relative probability of opting














If we assume that the origin country j belongs only to a singleton,19 then we can express






















17When the discrete choice model is generated by (2), ijk contains additive nest-specic stochastic compo-
nents; the correlation of the unobserved component of utility in (1) between two dierent origin-destination
dyads depends on (i) the allocation vector  corresponding to each dyad, and (ii) on the dissimilarity
parameter , which is inversely related to the correlation across alternatives of the nest-specic stochas-
tic components. If the inner product of the two allocation vectors is equal to zero, then the unobserved
components of utility for the two origin-destination dyads are uncorrelated.
18The choice probability in (3) can also be expressed as pijk =
P
m pijkjbmpijbm, where pijkjbm is the
probability of opting for destination k conditional upon choosing a destination belonging to the nest bm, and
pijbm is the probability of choosing a destination in the nest bm (Wen and Koppelman, 2001).
19Formally, this implies that there is a nest bh such that jjh = 1, and jlh = 0 for all l 2 D.
82.2 Migration ows and Multilateral Resistance to Migration
Imagine that individual migration decisions are observed over a set T of periods; the log of
the scale of migration ows to country k at time t 2 T over the size of the population which
opts for the origin country j, yjkt, can be derived from the RUM model by averaging (5)








+ rjkt + jkt (6)
The error term jkt is orthogonal to xjkt and xjjt, serially uncorrelated, and independently















The term rjkt in (7) represents the multilateral resistance to migration, as it captures the
inuence exerted by the opportunities to migrate to other destinations upon migration from
country j to country k at time t. Taking the partial derivative of rjkt with respect to the




















The multilateral resistance to migration term rjkt is always a non-increasing function
of Vjlt, and the inequality in (8) is equal to zero only if jk
0jl = 0. An increase in Vjlt
redirects towards l proportionally more individuals that would have opted for destination k
than individuals who would have stayed in the country of origin j, thus reducing the bilateral
migration rate yjkt in (6).
93 Estimation strategy
The distribution of the stochastic term ijk in (1), which depends upon the specic assump-
tions about the GEV generating function, are closely related to the shape of the multilateral
resistance to migration term rjkt in (6). This section analyzes which are the specications
about the GEV generating function in (2) which justify the alternative econometric ap-
proaches that have been adopted in the literature, and it then introduces the more general
specication adopted in this paper, and the ensuing econometric strategy.
3.1 The traditional approach
As recalled in the introduction, the traditional estimation approach in the migration lit-
erature assumes that the bilateral migration rate can be expressed as a function of origin
and characteristics only (Hanson, 2010). This approach, which has been adopted by Clark,
Hatton, and Williamson (2007), Pedersen, Pytlikova, and Smith (2008), Lewer and den Berg
(2008), Mayda (2010) and Grogger and Hanson (2011), uses all the variability in the data
to identify the vector of coecients .20
In terms of our RUM model, this requires that no multilateral resistance to migration
term rjkt appears in the equation to be estimated. Going back to (7), this happens if and
only if the allocation matrix j is a n(j)  n(j) identity matrix, so that any location is
entirely allocated to a singleton, and the multilateral resistance to migration term rjkt which
appears in (6) is identically equal to zero.
This assumption on the allocation matrix implies that the underlying GEV generating






The function G1 in (9) entails that ijk in (1) follows an Extreme Value Type-1 distribution
(McFadden, 1974), and it generates the choice probabilities that identify the multinomial
logit model:
20When the dataset has a longitudinal dimension, the inclusion of origin dummies removes the variability





The multinomial logit model is characterized by the Independence of Irrelevant Alter-
natives,21 as the relative probability of opting for two destinations is independent from the
attractiveness, or even the existence, associated to any other destination: an increase in the
attractiveness of another destination draws proportionally from all the other destinations,
so that relative choice probabilities remain unchanged.22
Train (2003) observes that the distribution of the stochastic component ijk \is not dened
by the choice situation per se", and IIA can actually \be interpreted as a natural outcome of
a well-specied model". Still, data constraints are often binding in the migration literature,
and they can induce to opt for a parsimonious specication of the location-specic utility, so
that it is relevant to explore identication strategies which can accommodate for a correlation
in unobservables across alternatives, which in turn implies that the multilateral resistance
to migration term rjkt is present in the equation to be estimated.
3.2 The inclusion of origin-time dummies
While the traditional approach made full use of the variability across destinations and origins
and over time in the data to identify the vector of coecients , Ortega and Peri (2009) have
reduced the amount of variability used for identication through the inclusion of origin-time
dummies.
The identication strategy adopted in Ortega and Peri (2009) is consistent with their
proposed underlying RUM model, which generalizes the one in Grogger and Hanson (2011)
by \allowing for unobserved individual heterogeneity between migrants and non-migrants".
The inclusion of origin-time dummies makes their estimation approach consistent with the
discrete choice model which is produced by the following GEV generating function:
21The multinomial logit choice probabilities in (10) were originally derived by Luce (1959) from the IIA
property, which represented a corollary of a set of axioms about the choice over discrete alternatives that he
had proposed; Debreu (1960) provided an early critique of the plausibility of the IIA property.
22Grogger and Hanson (2011) verify that the estimated coecient for the income dierential remains
stable when destinations are removed from the choice set of prospective migrants, as a violation of the IIA
assumption would entail instability of the estimated coecients (Hausman and McFadden, 1984).
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which can be derived from (2) assuming that the allocation matrix j is the following




1 0 0 ::: 0
0 1 1 ::: 1
!
(12)
The allocation matrix in (12) implies that the two nests represent a partition of the set
Dj, as all the destinations in D are entirely allocated to the same nest, while the origin j
belongs to a singleton. The GEV generating function G2 gives rise to the choice probability
corresponding to the nested logit (McFadden, 1978), and it also implies that the multilateral
resistance to migration term rjkt in (7) can be simplied to:







The key characteristic of (13) is that it is invariant across destination countries for a
given time t. Hence, the inclusion of origin-time dummies suces to control for multilateral
resistance to migration when the discrete choice probabilities are generated by the function
in (11). This reduces the variability that is used to identify , to remove the inuence of
the time-varying component of multilateral resistance to migration in (13).
When the dataset only has one either cross-sectional or longitudinal dimension, (13) also
entails that the inclusion of either origin or time dummies suces to make the identication
strategy consistent with the specic violation of IIA induced by the GEV generating function
G2. This implies that the estimates provided in Beine, Docquier, and Ozden (2011), who
assume that the stochastic components of their RUM model follows an Extreme Value Type-
1 distribution, and in Theoharides, McKenzie, and Yang (2010) can be consistent even if IIA
is violated in this specic way.
The inclusion of origin-time dummies among the controls implies that the underlying
pattern of substitution across alternative locations is richer than in the traditional approach:
an increase in the attractiveness of destination l can draw from another destination k more
than it does from the origin country j, so that the bilateral migration rate yjkt falls.23
23This approach shares a key feature with the traditional approach, as the sorting of migrants across
123.3 A more general approach
Let us go back to the general specication for the multilateral resistance to migration term
rjkt, which is produced by the more general GEV generating function G in (2), with no
restrictions on the size and composition of the allocation matrix j.24 We reproduce here














Dierently from Ortega and Peri (2009), the term rjkt varies across destinations, as
these can be allocated unevenly across dierent nests. Hence, the inclusion of origin-time
dummies would not suce to control for multilateral resistance to migration. Consider
also that rjkt is unobservable for the econometrician, as it depends (i) on the value of
deterministic component of location-specic utility for countries other than j and k, and (ii)
on the unobserved allocation matrix j, which reects unknown preferences of prospective
migrants.










"jkt = rjkt + jkt (14)
The multilateral resistance to migration rjkt entails that the error term "jkt in (14) is
not well-behaved. Specically, rjkt will be, in general, serially correlated, as the resistance
to migration exerted by other destinations is likely to evolve slowly over time, and spatially
correlated across origin-destination dyads.
With respect to spatial correlation, observe that rjkt will be in general correlated with rjlt:
the bilateral migration rates from the same origin country j to the two destinations k and l
destinations l and k is still insensitive to a variation in the attractiveness of a third destination g 2 D.
24As observed by McFadden (2001), \tractable versions [of GEV models] fall short of being able to represent
all RUM-consistent behavior", but the discrete choice model produced by the specic GEV generating
function introduced by Wen and Koppelman (2001) and used in this paper represents the least restrictive
used so far in the migration literature.
13will be both inuenced by the attractiveness of migration to other alternative destinations.
By the same token, in general we will also have that rjkt will be correlated with rhkt: the
bilateral migration rates from two dierent origins j and h to the same destination k will both
be aected by the attractiveness of migration to other alternative destinations. Multilateral
resistance to migration induces spatial correlation not only for the ows towards various
destinations from the same origin country, but also for the ows originating from dierent
origins and directed to the same destination country.25
When the error term is serially and spatially correlated, OLS still provides consistent
estimates of the coecients  (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998), but the standard errors will be
incorrect. Driscoll and Kraay (1998) propose an approach to estimate the standard errors of
the coecients which is robust to non-spherical errors, and that be implemented following
Hoechle (2007).
Still, the approach by Driscoll and Kraay (1998) addresses only some of the challenges
posed by multilateral resistance to migration, as it requires exogeneity of the regressors. But
the presence of rjkt in the error term is likely to violate the exogeneity assumption, as rjkt
can be correlated with the regressors.
To get an intuition of the endogeneity problem due to multilateral resistance to migration,
consider a likely key macro determinant of the scale of migration ows, namely GDP per
capita at origin, which enters the vector xjjt. GDP per capita at origin j can correlate with
GDP per capita in some of the destination countries, which are included in rjkt; this can
occur because of the exposure to common economic shocks, or because of a partial business
cycle synchronization due to trade and investment ows.
We can also consider the case where visa policy at destination enters the vector xjkt.
Visa policies - which can exert a substantial inuence on the scale of bilateral migration
ows (Bertoli, Fern andez-Huertas Moraga, and Ortega, 2011) - can be coordinated at the
supranational level. For instance, the list of third countries whose nationals need a visa
to enter the European Union is determined by the European Council: when a country is
included in this list, a simultaneous change in the bilateral visa policies towards this country
adopted by EU member states is observed. As far as EU countries are perceived as close
substitutes by would-be migrants from third countries, we have that xjkt correlates with rjkt.
25This, in turn, implies that multilateral resistance to migration can represent a challenge for the econo-
metric analysis even if, as in Clark, Hatton, and Williamson (2007), the data relate to ows to a single
destination.
14These arguments entail that we need an estimator that is also able to handle the endo-
geneity of the regressors.26
3.3.1 The multifactor error structure in Pesaran (2006)




0xit + it (15)
where:
it = i
0ft + it (16)
The error term has a multifactor structure,27 as it contains the inner product between a
vector i of panel-specic factor loadings, and a vector ft of time-varying factors. Pesaran
(2006) allows the error term it to be heteroskedastic28, serially and spatially correlated,
and correlated with the regressors, and it proposes a consistent estimator for the coecient
vector  which does not require to know the dimension of the vector ft, nor the elements in
the vector i.
Here, we want to show that the multilateral resistance to migration term rjkt, which
enters the equation to be estimated, can be approximated in a way that ts the multifactor
error structure in (16). Let e Vjl the dyad-specic average of the deterministic component of
utility V . Relying on a Taylor expansion around e Vjl, we can approximate the multilateral
resistance to migration term rjkt introduced in (7) as follows:










(e pjltjbn)(Vjlt   e Vjl)
i
(17)
where e rjk and e pjltjbn represent respectively the value of rjkt and of the probability pjltjbn
of opting for destination l conditional upon the choice of the nest bn in correspondence to the
dyad-specic averages e Vjl. Observe that the rst term of the product within square brackets
26The use of external instruments is hardly an option here, as endogeneity is not conned to a regressor,
but to all relevant determinants of the scale of migration ows.
27Bai (2009) refers to the same structure of the error term as the interactive xed eects model.
28Even if we do not derive our estimated equation from a log-linearization, this allows us to fully address
the challenges posed by heteroskedasticity which are detailed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006).
15in (17) is dyad-specic, while the second term is time-specic; hence, using vector notation,
we can rewrite (17) more compactly as:
rjkt  e rjk + jk
0ft (18)
The elements in the vector of dyad-specic factor loadings jk depend on the unobservable
preferences of individuals from origin j, which are reected in the allocation matrix j, as
well as upon the unknown dissimilarity parameter , while the elements in the vector ft are
an ane function of the deterministic component of location-specic utility.
Using (18), we can rewrite the equation to be estimated as:
yjkt = 1
0xjkt + 2
0xjjt + jkdjk + jkt (19)
where djk is a dummy for the dyad (j;k), and jkt = jk
0ft + jkt, and the vectors
of coecient to be estimated are related to the parameters in the RUM model as follows:
1 = = and 2 =  .
3.3.2 The Common Correlated Eects estimator
The presence of a multifactor error structure which correlates with the regressors implies
that OLS or FE estimates of 1 and 2 in (19) will be inconsistent. Pesaran (2006) proposes
an alternative estimator: the Common Correlated Eects (CCE) estimator, which is able
to control for the unobserved multifactor component of the error term. In terms of the
equation derived from our underlying RUM model, the CCE estimator allows us to recover
a consistent estimate of the eects of the determinants of bilateral migration ows without
having to assume that IIA holds, and allowing for a more general violation of IIA than the
one considered in Ortega and Peri (2009).
Pesaran (2006) demonstrates that i
0ft in (15) can be expressed as a dyad-specic linear
combination of the cross-sectional averages of the dependent variable and of the regressors.
Specically, he demonstrates that a consistent estimate of , bCCE, can be obtained from
the estimation, through OLS, of the following regression:
yjkt = 1
0xjkt + 2
0xjjt + jkdjk + jk
0e zt + jkt (20)

















and !jkt is the weight assigned to each origin-destination dyad at time t in the estimation.
The consistency of bCCE is established by Pesaran (2006) by demonstrating that jk
0e zt
converges in quadratic mean to jk
0ft as the cross-sectional dimension of the panel goes
to innity, with the longitudinal dimension being either xed or also diverging to innity
(Pesaran, 2006). Monte Carlo simulations in Pesaran (2006) also show the good nite sample
properties of the CCE estimator, which already produces satisfactory results when N = 30
and T = 20. Pesaran and Tosetti (2011) conrm these properties even when jkt is serially
or spatially correlated.
3.3.3 Multilateral resistance to migration and the CCE estimator
Some key features of the CCE estimator proposed by Pesaran (2006) are worth emphasiz-
ing in relationship with its application to the estimation of the determinants of bilateral
migration rates.
First, it does not require to know the dimension of the vector of time-specic common
shocks which enters the error term. This ts nicely with our general RUM model, as dierent
specications of the allocation matrix j translate into a dierent size of the vector ft which
approximates the multilateral resistance to migration term rjkt. This allows us to obtain
estimates of the vector of coecients  without having to introduce additional assumptions
on j.
Second, the CCE estimator allows us to identify the eects of determinants of bilateral
migration rates which are specic to each origin country, such as GDP per capita. This fur-
ther dierentiates our approach from Ortega and Peri (2009), as the inclusion of origin-time
dummies, which is not consistent with a more general GEV generating function, prevents
the identication of the eects of relevant push factors of migration ows.
Third, we do not need to have data on multiple destinations to be able to control for
multilateral resistance to migration with the CCE estimator. Recall, from (17) and (18), that
the rjkt term is an ane function of the deterministic component of utility Vjlt for the same
origin country j. So, a legitimate question arises: is it possible to control for multilateral
resistance to migration even when the data refer to a cross-section of origins, but to a single
destination? The answer to this question is positive, and it relates to the discussion about
17the pattern of spatial correlation induced by multilateral resistance to migration discussed
in Section 3.3.
The pattern of correlation in the error term, not only across destinations but also across
origins, contains information about the unobserved attractiveness of other destinations, and
to the related unobserved bilateral ows. Intuitively, once one controls for the observed
determinants of bilateral ows, residual simultaneous variations in the ows to a given desti-
nation from the origin countries included in the sample are acting as a mirror, reecting the
eects of changes in the opportunities to migrate to other unobserved destinations. The e-
cacy of such a mirror eects depends on the similarity of the structure of preferences across
dierent origins, as reected in the allocation matrix j, and on the correlation between the
attractiveness of various destinations. Similarity in the preferences across origin countries
or correlation in the deterministic component of utility across destinations imply that the
cross-sectional averages of the dependent and of the independent variables referring only to
other origin countries which enter the vector of auxiliary regressors e zt provides us with the
information that is needed to control for the inuence exerted by multilateral resistance to
migration on bilateral ows.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
Our dataset has three main components: migration ows to Spain in the 1997-2009 period;
migration policies in Spain during the same period; and quarterly real GDP series for the
countries of origin of migrants to Spain. Here, we rst present each of these components and
we look at their main characteristics, then we provide the relevant descriptive statistics.
4.1 Migration ows
The migration ows data come from the Estad stica de Variaciones Residenciales (EVR).
This is an administrative dataset collected by the Spanish Instituto Nacional de Estad stica
(INE). The EVR gathers all the variations in the municipal registry (Padr on Municipal de
Habitantes) throughout the year: each observation in the EVR corresponds either to an
inscription in or to a cancelation from the Padr on, and it includes information on the date
in which the variation occurred, and on the age, gender and country of birth of the individual
to whom the variation refers. We use the observations referring to the rst inscription of
18Figure 1: Monthly Immigration Inows to Spain 1997-2009 (EVR)
foreign-born individuals coming from abroad in the Padr on to measure immigration ows
to Spain: the EVR contains 6,166,133 of these observations between January 1997 and
December 2009,29 related to individuals from 208 countries of origin.30
By restricting our attention to inscriptions of foreign-born individuals coming to Spain
from abroad, we are obtaining an almost perfect measure of gross immigration inows. The
measure would be perfect if every individual registered immediately upon arrival. Although
registration is not mandatory, most immigrants eventually do register, independently of their
legal status, as registration gives them access to all basic municipality services, most notably
free health care and education (Bertoli, Fern andez-Huertas Moraga, and Ortega, 2011). The
Appendix A.1 discusses in detail the accuracy of the EVR in measuring immigration ows
to Spain, comparing EVR gures with those that can be obtained from alternative data
sources.
Figures 1 and 2 plot the monthly and quarterly series of immigration ows to Spain
over our period of analysis according to the EVR. Despite the large apparent variability in
the overall immigration series, there does not seem to be relevant seasonal patterns in the
data. None is found if we regress quarterly data on year and quarter dummies: the quarterly
dummies are not signicant. For the monthly data, a regression on year and month dummies
shows the months of August and December as those in which registrations are signicantly
29As recalled in the introduction, these gures correspond to an unprecedented - even from an international
perspective (OECD, 2010) - surge in immigration.
30The EVR also codies some former states, such as the USSR or Yugoslavia.
19Figure 2: Quarterly Immigration Inows to Spain 1997-2009 (EVR)
Figure 3: Total ows and excluding immigrants from Bulgaria and Romania (1997-2009)
lower (between 15 and 20 percent) than in the rest of the year, coinciding with the summer
and winter holidays in Spain.
There are three noticeable spikes in the series: the rst one corresponds to the January
2000 law that ensured access to basic services for those registered (Ley Org anica 4/2000);
the second one can be associated to the 2005 massive amnesty and happened in November
2004; nally, the third one has to do with the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU
in January 2007, taking into account that Romanians have created the largest immigrant
community in Spain (see Figure 3 for the evolution of total ows excluding the two most
recent EU member states).
20Our analysis aggregates the EVR data at the quarterly level, as this is the nest period
of time for which we can gather information on the economic conditions at origin. We
restrict our sample to the origin countries with a positive total number of immigrants in all
the 52 quarters included in our period of analysis: 98.6 percent of total migration ows to
Spain between January 1997 and December 2009 originated from these countries,31 whose
population represents 86 percent of the world total.
In our empirical analysis below, our dependent variable will be the log of the emigra-
tion rate to Spain from a given origin country over a quarter, consistently with the model
presented in Section 2. This is calculated as the total number of immigrants to Spain from
origin country j who registered during a given quarter divided by the population of that
country of origin j in that year.32
4.2 Spanish migration policies
We gather data on Spanish migration policies between 1997 and 2009; specically, we codify
the following policies which are likely to inuence bilateral migration ows in the EVR:
(i) general policies - the 2000 Amnesty, the 2005 Amnesty; (ii) bilateral policies - visa
agreements, double nationality agreements, social security agreements, agreements on the
signature of labor contracts at origin; and (iii) multilateral treaties - membership to the EU-
15, membership to the Schengen area, 2004 EU enlargement, 2007 EU enlargement. The
Appendix A.2 describes the denition and sources of these variables.
Our database comprises 8 EU-wide agreements transposed into Spanish Law through
Decrees,33 48 national Laws, Resolutions and Orders dealing with migration issues,34 and 94
bilateral agreements between Spain and origin countries regarding matters such as the need
of a visa to enter Spain, portability of social security benets and the legal recognition of
31The share of the observations where the recorded migration ow is equal to zero is much lower than in
the dataset employed by Beine, Docquier, and Ozden (2011), where it stands at 36 percent; Beine, Docquier,
and Ozden (2011) assess the sensitivity of their estimates to the inclusion of these zero observations, and
they validate the estimates obtained from the specications where these observations are dropped from the
sample as \results are highly robust to various econometric techniques accounting for the large proportion
of zeros". A similar conclusion is reached also by Grogger and Hanson (2011).
32Our population gures are taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2010), and vary
only at the yearly level.
33The EU enlargement to 25 members that applied from May 1, 2004 is one such entry in our database
34These include, for example, the 2005 amnesty that applied from February 7, 2005 to May 7, 2005.
21educational degrees. We have taken the data from the web pages of the Ministry for Labor
and Immigration and the Bolet n Ocial del Estado, a daily ocial bulletin where all Spanish
legislation is published.
We model these migration policies as dummy variables that change from 0 to 1 from
the month the policy is applied. For instance, the 2000 Amnesty is modeled as a 0 before
January 2000 and as a 1 afterwards. Another example, already studied by Bertoli, Fern andez-
Huertas Moraga, and Ortega (2011) is the bilateral agreement between Ecuador and Spain
regarding the need of a visa for Ecuadorians to enter Spain. We model this as a dummy
taking value 1 when a visa is needed to enter Spain and value 0 otherwise; in the Ecuadorian
case, this means the value of the visa dummy is 0 before August 2003 and 1 after that date.
We present a more detailed description of the construction of the dataset in the Appendix
A.2.
This set of ten variables is able to explain, in a simple OLS regression, up to 54 percent
of the total variation on the log of the monthly or quarterly emigration rates to Spain by
country of origin. This shows that our migration policy specication has a good deal of
variability and potential explanatory power.
4.3 Economic conditions at origin
Our estimation strategy requires the use of high-frequency data, and we were able to gather
quarterly real GDP data for 61 origin countries, representing 87 percent of total migration
ows to Spain over the 1997-2009 period. As detailed in the Appendix A.3, our data sources
are the International Financial Statistics (IMF, 2010a), the April 2010 issue of the World
Economic Outlook (IMF, 2010b) and the data published by some Central Banks.
We divide our quarterly real GDP series by the yearly population gures from the World
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2010) to obtain real GDP per capita series that we
use as a proxy for the time-varying economic conditions at origin. Since the series vary
widely in terms of base year, adjustments on seasonality, base currency and other aspects,
we construct a country-specic seasonally-adjusted real GDP per capita index (setting the
index equal to 100 in the rst quarter of 2000). The raw correlation between the log of the
GDP per capita index by quarter and country of origin and the log of the emigration rate
to Spain is 0.05. In a simple regression of the two variables, the coecient on the GDP
per capita index is 0.8 and is only able to explain 0.3 percent of the variation in quarterly
22Figure 4: Quarterly Immigration Inows to Spain, total and selected sample (1997-2009)
emigration rates.
4.4 Summary statistics
When combining our migration ows, migration policies and real GDP per capita datasets,
we are left with 3,020 observations. Out of the 6,166,133 immigrants who, according to the
EVR, entered Spain between January 1997 and December 2009 coming from 208 countries,
we keep in our sample 5,341,586 immigrants coming from 61 countries, which host 51 percent
of the world population. Figure 4 shows that these 61 countries keep the basic time series
structure of the overall number of immigrants.
We present in Table 1 some summary statistics of this emigration rate (expressed in
migrants to Spain per 1,000,000 inhabitants) and of the GDP per capita index in our sample.
In order to allow a straightforward comparison, we also construct a country-specic index
for emigration rates. We weight observations by the population of the country of origin since
we are interested in exploring determinants of emigration rates over the whole population.
Table 1 shows that the variability is much more substantial in the emigration rate than in
the GDP per capita during the period. The mean emigration rate per quarter to Spain was
32.88 emigrants per 1,000,000 inhabitants with a maximum in the sample of 3,099 emigrants
in the rst quarter of 2007 from Romania and a minimum of 0.01 in the rst quarter of
1997 from Indonesia. For the country-specic index, the average of 268 reects the growth
in migration rates from 2000. The relative maximum (15,740) corresponds to Paraguay in
23Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable mean s.d. min max obs.
Emigrants to Spain per 1,000,000 inhabitants 32.88 136.75 0.01 3,098.78 3,020
Emigration rate index (2000q1=100) 267.58 381.83 0.30 15,470.04 3,020
Real GDP per capita index (2000q1=100) 115.17 19.91 69.61 223.34 3,020
January 2000 Amnesty 0.83 0.37 0 1 3,020
November 2004 Amnesty 0.44 0.49 0 1 3,020
EU-15 0.11 0.31 0 1 3,020
Schengen Area 0.09 0.28 0 1 3,020
EU May 2004 Eastern Enlargement 0.01 0.10 0 1 3,020
EU May 2007 Romania and Bulgaria Enlargement 0.002 0.05 0 1 3,020
Visa requirement 0.57 0.50 0 1 3,020
Bilateral Agreement on Nationality 0.05 0.23 0 1 3,020
Bilateral Agreement on Social Security 0.13 0.33 0 1 3,020
Bilateral Agreement on Contracts at Origin 0.02 0.13 0 1 3,020
Note: quarterly series on 61 countries (1997-2009), all descriptive statistics are weighted by popu-
lation at origin; see the Appendix A.2 for a description of the immigration policy variables.
the rst quarter of 2007 whereas the minimum (0.30) is Ecuador in the rst quarter of 1997.
For the GDP per capita index, the average value (weighted by population) in the sample is
115 with a minimum of 70 for Venezuela in the rst quarter of 2003 and a maximum of 223
for Georgia in the second quarter of 2008. We can observe the scatter-plot of the log of both
indexes in Figure 5.
It is perhaps more informative to look directly at the time series evolution of the vari-
ables the way they will be used in the empirical analysis below. The following series of
gures present this representation for the log of the emigration rate and the log of real GDP
per capita for the four top emigrant sending countries to Spain during the period: Roma-
nia (809,857 emigrants), Morocco (666,798 emigrants), Ecuador (490,580 emigrants) and
Colombia (377,780 emigrants).
Figures 6 to 9 show that, despite a general upward time trend in most of the series that
the empirical analysis will have to account for, there is substantial time and cross-sectional
variation to be exploited in the dataset.
24Figure 5: Emigration and GDP at origin, selected sample (1997-2009)
Figure 6: Emigration and GDP at origin, Romania
25Figure 7: Emigration and GDP at origin, Morocco
Figure 8: Emigration and GDP at origin, Ecuador
26Figure 9: Emigration and GDP at origin, Colombia
5 Econometric analysis
The econometric analysis of the determinants of bilateral migration ows to Spain over 1997-
2009 follows the steps entailed by the estimation strategy outlined in Section 3. We report




0xjjt + jkdjk + jk
0e zt + jkt
Consistently with the model, the dependent variable yjkt is represented by the log of the
quarterly migration rate to Spain for each of the 61 origin countries included in our sample.
The vector xjkt contains a number of dyad-specic elements, represented by the bilateral
immigration policies and multilateral treaties described in Section 4.2, while we control
for all origin-invariant factors - such as the level of GDP or unemployment at destination
- through the inclusion of quarter xed eects, and for all time-invariant factors - such
as cultural or linguistic proximity - through origin xed eects. The vector xjjt includes
(various lags of) the log of real GDP per capita at origin, and origin-year xed eects to
control for all unobserved origin- and dyad-specic time-varying determinants of bilateral
migration ows.35
With respect to our measure of GDP at origin, we include lagged values given that we
35The origin-year xed eects also render our GDP per capita and emigration rate series stationary
although the CCE estimator can accommodate unit roots.
27have high-frequency migration data, and one can reasonably assume that would-be migrants
do not react instantaneously to changes in economic conditions. We relied on the Akaike and
Bayesian Information Criteria, and on Likelihood Ratio tests in order to select the optimal
lag structure for each specication as suggested in Canova (2007), thus avoiding ad hoc
choices. The optimal number of lags selected was four with all methods.
As a rst step, we assume, as in Grogger and Hanson (2011) and Beine, Docquier, and
Ozden (2011) that the stochastic term in the individual location-specic utility follows an
Extreme Value Type-1 distribution, so that multilateral resistance to migration disappears,
and (20) simplies to:36
yjkt = 1
0xjkt + 2
0xjjt + jkdjk + jkt
This equation is estimated with a two-way error component model, and the results are
presented in the rst data column in Table 2. The model controls for origin-year xed
eects. The inclusion of this very rich structure of xed eects allows us to control for those
determinants of migration, such as demographic factors (Hanson and McIntosh, 2010a,b)
or migrant networks (Munshi, 2003; Edin, Fredriksson, and  Aslund, 2003; McKenzie and
Rapoport, 2010; Beine, Docquier, and Ozden, 2011; Bertoli, 2010), which evolve at a pace
that is slower than the frequency of our panel data. This substantially reduces the variability
in the data that we are exploiting to identify the coecient vector  but we are still able to
precisely estimate the eect of GDP variations on migration decisions.
According to the rst data column in Table 2, a 1.0 percent increase in real GDP per
capita leads, after four quarters, to a 4.7 percent reduction in the migration rate to Spain.37
The estimates from this specication are consistent as long as multilateral resistance to
migration does not inuence bilateral migration ows to Spain. From Section 3, we know
36Observe that, as multilateral resistance to migration rjkt does not enter the equation to be estimated,
endogeneity should not be a pressing concern here: some of the crucial facets of the Spanish policy stance
towards immigration are determined at the EU level and bilateral migration ows to Spain can be expected
to exert only a very limited - if any - impact on economic conditions at origin. Remember that the largest
emigration rate in our sample is 0.3 percent of the Romanian population in the rst quarter of 2007. The
median emigration rate in the sample is just 0.0002 percent.
37Note that this eect is notably larger than that found by Clark, Hatton, and Williamson (2007) for US
immigration, which stands at 0.44; dierently from them, we consider both legal and illegal immigration and
exploit within-year variability in GDP. Our country-year xed eects allow us to control for a much wider
set of possible confounding factors that evolve slowly over time.
28Table 2: Determinants of migration
Dependent variable: log of quarterly emigration rate
Specication (1) (2) (3)
Estimation methods FE FE CCE
Regressors Lags
Log real GDP per capita 1 -1.57 -1.57 -1.57
[0.24]*** [0.52]*** [0.29]***
2 -1.05 -1.05 -0.46
[0.26]*** [0.40]** [0.29]
3 -0.93 -0.93 -0.60
[0.27]*** [0.52]* [0.28]**
4 -1.18 -1.18 -0.52
[0.26]*** [0.62]* [0.31]*
Visa requirement 0 -0.15 -0.15 -1.34
[0.13] [0.23] [0.30]***
Other migration policy controls yes yes yes
Quarter xed eects yes yes yes
Origin-year xed eects yes yes yes
Observations 2,776 2,776 2,776
Countries of origin 61 61 61
Frees' test (p-value) 2.71 (0.00) - -
Wooldridge's test (p-value) 32.64 (0.00) - -
Cross-sectional averages (p-value) - - 2.11 (0.00)
GDP per capita, cumulated eect 1 -1.57 -1.57 -1.57
[0.24]*** [0.52]*** [0.29]***
2 -2.63 -2.63 -2.02
[0.28]*** [0.51]*** [0.35]***
3 -3.56 -3.56 -2.62
[0.33]*** [0.74]*** [0.43]***
4 -4.74 -4.74 -3.14
[0.37]*** [1.03]*** [0.53]***
Notes: standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; observations
are weighted by population at origin; the number of lags of log real GDP per capita
has been determined according to AIC, BIC and LR tests to identify the optimal
lag structure following Canova (2007); specication (2) includes standard errors
computed following Driscoll and Kraay (1998); for specication (3), we present an
F-test that the coecients on cross-sectional averages in the CCE estimator are
jointly zero, calculated on F(659,1,378).
29that this would induce spatial and serial correlation in the error term, and we follow Frees
(1995) and Wooldridge (2002) to test for the presence of cross-sectional dependence and an
autoregressive structure in the residuals.38
Table 2 shows that the null hypotheses of both tests are strongly rejected,39 and this
suggests that bilateral migration ows to Spain could be inuenced by multilateral resistance
to migration. This entails that the standard errors provide an incorrect basis for inference,
and we re-estimated the same specication resorting to the method proposed by Driscoll
and Kraay (1998) to obtain standard errors which are robust to serial and cross-sectional
dependence in the error term.40 The estimates in the second data column in Table 2 show
that income at origin remains a signicant determinant of bilateral migration ows - though
the correction by Driscoll and Kraay (1998) substantially inates its standard error, while
the eect of the visa policy is still not signicant. In Grogger and Hanson (2011), the eect
of the visa waiver was marginally signicant.
Still, these estimates are biased and inconsistent as multilateral resistance to migration
is likely to make the regressors endogenous, as discussed in Section 3. Before resorting to
the CCE estimator proposed by Pesaran (2006), which we have shown to be well-suited to
address this specic form of endogeneity, it is interesting to consider the expected direction
of the bias induced by multilateral resistance to migration with respect to the estimated
coecients of the GDP at origin and of the visa policy.
If real GDP per capita at origin correlates positively with real GDP per capita in some
destinations that would-be migrants perceive as close substitutes to Spain, then the coe-
cient estimated in specications (1)-(2) in Table 2 is downward biased. This occurs because
an increase in GDP at origin is associated with an improvement in the attractiveness of other
alternative destinations: if this is not controlled for, then the estimated eect of GDP at
origin also captures the reduction in migration ows to Spain due to the increased attrac-
tiveness of other destination countries. This might be the relevant case with our dataset:
Bertoli, Fern andez-Huertas Moraga, and Ortega (2010) provided evidence that prospective
38We opted for the test for cross-sectional dependence proposed by Frees (1995) over the alternative test
proposed by Pesaran (2004) as the latter could lack power and \miss out cases of cross-sectional dependence
where the sign of the correlations is alternating" (De Hoyos and Saradis, 2006), because the multilateral
resistance to migration term does not need to be positively correlated across dierent countries of origin.
39The two tests are implemented following De Hoyos and Saradis (2006) and Drukker (2003) respectively.
40The method by Driscoll and Kraay (1998) is implemented following Hoechle (2007).
30migrants from the third largest origin country, Ecuador, regard Spain and the US as close
substitutes, and the correlation between real GDP per capita in Ecuador and in the US
stands at 0.54 once origin-year xed eects are controlled for.41 Of course, the direction
of the bias depends on the prevailing pattern of correlation between the regressors and the
omitted variables, so that the expectation is dependent on the characteristics of the data in
the sample. If real GDP per capita at origin were to be negatively correlated with GDP per
capita at alternative destinations, the bias would go in the opposite direction.
A similar line of reasoning suggests that the coecient of the visa requirement estimated
in specications (1)-(2) in Table 2 is upward biased. A change in the Spanish visa policy
towards one origin country occurs when also the other EU member states are adopting
an identical change, when this decision follows a regulation by the European Council. An
instance of such a change occurred in March 2001, when the citizens of the countries which
were candidate to accession at that time were granted visa-free access to the EU by the EC
Regulation No. 539/2001.42 This regulation simultaneously changed the opportunities to
migrate to other EU destinations: if this eect is not controlled for, then the estimated eect
of the Spanish visa requirement also captures the increase in migration ows to Spain due to
changes in the visa policy in other member states, biasing the negative coecient upwards.43
The third data column in Table 2 presents the estimates obtained from the Common
Correlated Eects estimator proposed by Pesaran (2006). As shown in the bottom panel of
Table 2, the cross-sectional averages of the dependent and independent variables which are
introduced as auxiliary regressors are jointly signicant, which is required for the estimator
to be valid.44
41The correlation between real per capita GDP in Colombia, the fourth largest origin country, and the US
stands at 0.73, strengthening the expectation about the direction of the bias from neglecting multilateral
resistance to migration. The correlations between other top destinations and their main alternatives are
0.65 for Romania with the US and 0.74 for Morocco with France, while a negative correlation with the main
alternative destination only appears for one out of the 61 countries in the sample. The main alternatives
are taken from the magnitude of 1990-2000 net migration ows according to the dataset constructed by
Docquier, Lowell, and Marfouk (2009).
42The sample countries to which the EC Regulation No. 539/2001 applied are Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
43Similar arguments can be applied to other variables that we control for, such as those referring to the
2004 and 2007 EU enlargements.
44Notice that the CCE estimator can accommodate serial correlation and cross-sectional dependence of
jkt in (20) so that the Frees' and Wooldridge' tests are unnecessary. The same observation applies to
31With the CCE estimator, we nd that a 1.0 percent increase in real GDP per capita leads,
after four quarters, to a 3.1 percent reduction in the migration rate to Spain. This eect
is only 66 percent of the one estimated in specications (1)-(2), conrming in this case the
expectation that neglecting the inuence of the multilateral resistance to migration biases
the coecient of GDP downwards. Similarly, the estimated negative coecient of the visa
requirement is now highly signicant, and much larger than the one obtained in the previous
specications. The introduction of a visa requirement for non-immigrant admission to Spain
reduces the size of migration ows by 74 percent. This can be compared with the eects
from specications (1)-(2), which pointed to a much smaller (14 percent) and non signicant
reduction of migration ows. The CCE large estimated eect is in line with the ndings on
Ecuadorian migration to Spain in Bertoli, Fern andez-Huertas Moraga, and Ortega (2011).
These main results are robust to the exclusion of particular countries from the sample,
such as OECD, EU-15 countries or, more generally, countries with a GDP per capita higher
than the Spanish one. They are also robust to alternative denitions of the dependent
variable considering only working age individuals migration or male working age migration.
The specications corresponding to these robustness checks are included in the Appendix B.
6 Concluding remarks
The possible dependence of bilateral migration ows upon the time-varying attractiveness of
other destinations represents a source of concern for the econometric analysis of the determi-
nants of migration (Hanson, 2010), as it can introduce an omitted variable bias. This paper
has explored the relationship between the stochastic properties of the individual migration
decision problem, and the presence of such a bias: when the independence of irrelevant al-
ternatives does not characterize individual migration choices, then bilateral migration rates
depend on the opportunities to migrate to other countries, and we labeled this eect Multi-
lateral Resistance to Migration.
Consistent estimates of the determinants of bilateral migration ows can be obtained in
the presence of multilateral resistance to migration adopting the Common Correlated Eects
estimator proposed by Pesaran (2006). This approach is more general than others proposed
in the literature, which either rely on an ad hoc controls for the time-varying opportunities to
specication (2).
32migrate to other destinations (Mayda, 2010), or require more restrictive assumptions on the
stochastic properties of the model and do not allow to identify the eects of origin-specic
variables (Ortega and Peri, 2009).
This approach is applied to the analysis of high-frequency Spanish administrative data
on bilateral migration ows between 1997 and 2009, which are found to respond quickly and
signicantly to variations in economic conditions at origin, and to changes in the legal provi-
sions for non-immigrant admission. The econometric analysis shows the empirical relevance
of the concern expressed by Hanson (2010) in our data: if not accounted for, multilateral
resistance to migration would bias downwards the estimated eect of GDP at origin and
upwards the eect of visa policies upon bilateral migration ows to Spain.
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38A Data sources
A.1 Migration ows
A.1.1 The Estad stica de Variaciones Residenciales
The EVR is an administrative dataset: municipalities are responsible for keeping the mu-
nicipal registry up to date and the INE just compiles the information received from the
municipalities about variations in the Padr on. The EVR registers changes of status in the
Padr on, both inscriptions and cancelations, with each observation corresponding to one vari-
ation. We use the observations referring to the rst inscription of foreign-born individuals
coming from abroad in the Padr on to measure immigration ows to Spain: the EVR contains
6,166,133 of these observations between January 1997 and December 2009.
We can assess the accuracy of the EVR in measuring immigration ows to Spain by com-
paring it with other possible sources. These alternative sources are represented by the 2001
Population Census, the 2007 Encuesta Nacional de Immigrantes (ENI), a special survey for
foreign-born individuals, and various rounds of the quarterly Spanish labor survey, Encuesta
de Poblaci on Activa (EPA). The ENI was a special immigrant survey which was only ran
once between the last months of 2006 and the rst months of 2007, with a sample of approx-
imately 15,000 immigrants.45 The ENI and the EPA provide information about the year of
arrival to Spain of all immigrants, although the EPA does not contain this information for
the foreign-born who obtained Spanish citizenship.46
A.1.2 Total yearly ows
Our EVR data span the 1997-2009 period. Figure A.1 compares gross immigration ows into
Spain according to the EVR with the 2001 Population Census and the ENI,47 and it shows
that the EVR underestimates migration ows before 2000. In January 2000, the Spanish
government enacted a new immigration law which included both an amnesty and a provision
guaranteeing that immigrants would have access to basic public services such as health and
45The methodology to locate immigrants was based on past Padr on data and it is exactly the same
methodology used by the EPA.
46This entails that we have to take the EPA numbers as a lower bound, as one out of six immigrants
residing in Spain in 2010 was naturalized.
47Recall that, the 2007 ENI being a survey, it might fail to enumerate recently arrived immigrants.
39Figure A.1: Immigration inows to Spain (1997-2009)
education for their children as long as they register in the Padr on (see Bertoli, Fern andez-
Huertas Moraga, and Ortega (2011)). This shows as a spike in the 2000 EVR data that can
be attributed to the registration of both newly arrived immigrants and of those who had
come to Spain in the earlier years but had not registered yet.48 The EVR and ENI series
then pretty much coincide for the years 2002 and 2003 but they diverge again for 2004 and
2005 (we do not include the 2006 ENI arrivals because the survey was administered partly
in the last months of 2006). There are three possible explanations for the 2004 and 2005
divergence: (i) the ENI might be underestimating the number of newly arrived immigrants
because of a sampling problem, and of the bias due to the emigration of the foreign-born;
(ii) the 2005 amnesty may have induced more and more illegal immigrants to register; and
(iii) the 2004 EU enlargement may have made immigrants from Eastern Europe register
massively, even though they may have arrived much earlier.49
First, let us consider the likely magnitude of sampling problems in the 2007 ENI. As
the methodology to locate immigrants for the ENI is exactly the same methodology used
for the EPA, a comparable dataset would be the EPA for the rst quarter of 2007, which
interviewed around 10,500 immigrants. Figure A.2 shows the implied immigration ows to
Spain for dierent rounds of the rst quarter of the EPA between 2006 and 2010. The
48This may have been also helped by the 2000 and 2001 amnesties, even though being legally in the country
is irrelevant for registration.
49Incidentally, the 2007 EU enlargement to Romania and Bulgaria is behind the great surge in immigration
ows in 2007, as shown in Section 4.1.
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standard errors for the ENI and EPA numbers are between 10,000 and 25,000 immigrants.
Hence, what Figure A.2 shows is that sampling problems in the ENI could go on average
around half of the way in explaining the dierence between the ENI and the EVR. Taking
the year 2005, where the discrepancy between the EVR and the ENI is greatest (with 700,000
and 300,000 immigrants respectively), the most recent rounds (2009 and 2010) of the EPA
report that 500,000 immigrants arrived.
What about the bias due to the emigration of the foreign-born? The unique data source
is represented by the EVR itself, as Figure A.2 shows that there is little hope of gouging the
size of return migration or re-migration to third countries from the comparison of dierent
rounds of the EPA. A problem is represented by the fact that it is not mandatory to cancel
from the Padr on before leaving the country, and the law, while making inscription attrac-
tive, does not provide incentives to cancel registrations, and this entails that many episodes
of emigration of foreign-born individuals are likely to remain unreported. Fortunately, the
law changed in November 2003 (Ley Org anica 14/2003) so that non-EU immigrants (which
represented around 60 percent of the total immigrant population in 2005) must renew their
inscription every two years, otherwise they are removed from the Padr on, with the corre-
sponding variation being recorded in the EVR.50
Thus, reliable EVR estimates of the emigration of the foreign-born should be available
since 2006. It must be noted though that these gures may be reliable in terms of magnitude
50The EVR does not provide information on the country of destination of the foreign-born who do cancel
from the Padr on, and this is why we do not refer to these variations as instances of return migration.
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(i.e. every observation corresponds to an instance of emigration of a foreign-born individ-
ual), but not necessarily in terms of timing since there could be, at most, a two-year lag
between the actual departure and the variation recorded in the EVR. The analysis is further
complicated by the fact that the EVR does not provide the information about the date of
the rst inscription of the foreign-born who cancel from the Padr on. Taking all of this into
account, Figure A.3 shows the yearly gures of the emigration of the foreign-born according
to the EVR.
If we assume, because of the two-year delay, that outows recorded in 2006 (the rst year
to which the new law applies) correspond to actual departures in 2004, they would represent
18 percent of the 2004 gross inow, whereas 2007 outows correspond to 30 percent of the
2005 gross inow. Given the uncertainty about the timing of the ows, all that can be said is
that emigration could potentially go a large part of the way in explaining the discrepancies
between the EVR gures for 2004 and 2005, and the corresponding gures from the ENI.
Together with the sampling design problem, emigration of the foreign-born could even go all
the way in explaining the observed dierence.
With respect to point (iii) above, we can safely disregard the role of the 2004 EU en-
largement for the 2004 dierence in ows. There are two reasons for this: rst, none of the
enlargement countries accounts for a relevant share of immigration to Spain, with less than
14,000 immigrants in total (2 percent of the 2004 inow); second, Spain - unlike Sweden,
Ireland or the United Kingdom - imposed restrictions on mobility for two years after the
enlargement. Thus, the immigrants' situation did not really change until 2006.
42Figure A.4: Quarterly Net Migration Flows to Spain
In our empirical analysis, we exploit cross-country high frequency variations in migration
ows so that all of the discussed measurement problems in the EVR end up being absorbed
by our quarter xed eects. Measurement problems related to particular countries of origin
would only be an issue as long as they may not be absorbed as well by our origin-year xed
eects.
A.1.3 Total quarterly ows
The EPA represents the only other data source for which variation on migration ows at the
quarterly level can be obtained. By subtracting the stock of migrants in a given quarter from
the stock of migrants in the following quarter we can obtain a measure of net migration ows.
The quarterly migration series that we produce with this methodology can be compared to
the net migration ows obtained from the EVR (recall that gures for the emigration of the
foreign-born can only be considered reliable after 2006). This is what is done in Figure A.4.
The comparison of both time series indicates that the general trend and magnitude of the
ows is highly comparable in the two sources, especially taking into account the standard
errors associated with the EPA net ow. The raw correlation between the two net ows
series is 0.78, which is extremely high considering the uncertainty involving the timing of
emigration ows from the EVR.
43A.1.4 Immigration ows by origin
The EVR and the ENI look much more alike when we move to a country-level analysis. The
correlation coecient between origin-year observations from the EVR and from the ENI
between 1997 and 2005 is 0.88 (calculated over 604 country-year observations). If we restrict
the ENI sample to those country-year pairs for which there were at least 10 observations, we
are left with 177 country-year observations, for which the correlation with the EVR is still
0.84.51
We run basic regressions to check to what extent ENI origin-year observations can explain
EVR origin-observations: when we did so for the 177 common observations for which there
were at least 10 individuals in the ENI sample, the result is a coecient reassuringly equal
to 1.00.52 This could hide dierences on a country by country basis but, when we run origin-
specic regressions (with the caveat that the highest number of observations is 9 in these
regressions), we could not reject the coecient on the ENI numbers being 1 for any country
but Colombia at a 95 percent condence level (with a p-value of 0.0497).
When we run a regression with origin xed eects, the resulting coecient was 0.97 (not
statistically dierent from 1 at a 99 percent condence level). We also run a regression
with time xed eects exploiting the cross-sectional variation in the data, and the estimated
coecient was again 1.00. However, the last specication shows that the 2004 and 2005 year
xed eects are signicant, which indirectly suggests that point (iii) above about the 2005
amnesty (announced in the last months of 2004) did play a relevant role.
A.2 Spanish immigration policies
We detail below how each of the ten variables that describe how Spanish immigration policies
changed over our period of analysis (1997-2009) were built, and the corresponding legal
sources.
January 2000 Amnesty - the dummy variable takes value 1 for all countries from
January 2000 (source: Ley Org anica 4/2000).
51The share of total immigrants covered by this restriction is 85 percent both in the ENI and in the EVR.
52Of course, this result hides dierences on a year by year basis: running yearly regressions, we obtain a
coecient around 0.3 for the years 1997-1999, around 1 for 2000-2003, 1.3 in 2004 and 2.3 in 2005.
44November 2004 Amnesty - the dummy variable takes value 1 for all countries from
November 2004 (source: Real Decreto 2393/2004).
EU-15 - the dummy variable takes value 1 if the country of origin belongs to the European
Union as of 1997. Thus, it is 1 for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden
(source: www.europa.eu.int).
Schengen Area - the dummy variable takes value 1 from the inclusion of a country in
the Schengen Area. It is 1 in the whole sample period for Belgium, France, Luxembourg,
Monaco, Netherlands, Portugal and Germany; 1 from November 1997 for Italy, San Marino
and the Holy See; 1 from December 1997 for Austria; 1 from April 2000 for Greece; 1
from April 2001 for Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden; 1 from April 2008
for Hungary, Malta, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and
Slovenia; and 1 from January 2009 for Switzerland (source: www.europa.eu.int).
EU May 2004 Eastern Enlargement - the dummy variable takes value 1 from May
2004 for Cyprus, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Slo-
vakia and Slovenia (source: www.europa.eu.int).
EU January 2007 Romania and Bulgaria Enlargement - the dummy variable takes
value 1 from January 2007 for Romania and Bulgaria (source: www.europa.eu.int).
Visa requirement for non-immigrant admission - the dummy variable takes value
1 for those countries and periods for which a visa was required to enter Spain. It is 1 for all
values with the exception of the following: members of the EU-15 group; Andorra; Iceland;
Norway; Liechtenstein; Croatia; country-month pairs for which the Schengen area dummy
is 1; Eastern Enlargement (2004 and 2007) countries plus Switzerland from April 2001;
Chile; Peru; Argentina; Bolivia until March 2007; Colombia until December 2001; Ecuador
until July 2003; Venezuela; Paraguay; Brazil; Uruguay; Mexico; Costa Rica; El Salvador;
Guatemala; Honduras; Panama; Nicaragua; Australia; New Zealand; Canada; United States;
South Korea; Brunei; Israel; Japan; Malaysia; Singapore; Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas,
Barbados, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Seychelles and Mauritius from June 2009. The sources are
Schengen Area regulations (www.europa.eu.int; www.maec.es and www.boe.es) and bilateral
agreements of Spain with Latin American countries (www.mtin.es and www.boe.es).
Bilateral agreement on double nationality - the dummy takes value 1 if a bilat-
eral agreement on double nationality with Spain exists: Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras,
45Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay
and Peru (sources: www.mtin.es and www.boe.es).
Bilateral agreement on social security - the dummy takes value 1 if a bilateral
agreement on Social Security with Spain exists: Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador,
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela for the whole period; Panama until May 2000;
Dominican Republic from July 2006; and Colombia from March 2008 (sources: www.mtin.es
and www.boe.es).
Bilateral agreement on contracts at origin - the dummy takes value 1 from the mo-
ment when a bilateral agreement that allows to sign in the country of origin a labor contract
with a Spanish employer is applied: Colombia from June 2001, Ecuador from July 2001,
Dominican Republic from February 2002 and Peru from August 2004 (sources: www.mtin.es
and www.boe.es).
A.3 GDP data
We gathered real GDP quarterly data for all countries of origin with a positive total number
of immigrants in all the quarters, and we were able to nd these data for 61 origin countries,
representing 87 percent of total immigration ows to Spain between 1997 and 2009.53 The
main data source was represented by IMF (2010a), which we combined with data from IMF
(2010b) and from various Central Banks.54 When the original series of real quarterly GDP
data were not seasonally adjusted, we implemented the adjustment regressing the log of real
GDP on a linear time trend and quarterly dummies, as suggested by Baum (2006).
53The population residing in these countries amount to 51 percent of the world total.
54IMF (2010b) provides information on the rate of growth of real quarterly GDP for several countries and
regional aggregates; for each origin country, Table A.1 reports whether the gures from IMF (2010b) are
country- or region-specic.
46Table A.1: Data sources for quarterly real GDP
Country Source from to SA obs.
Argentina IFS 1997q1 2009q4 no 52
Australia IFS 1997q1 2009q4 yes 52
Austria IFS 1997q1 2009q4 no 52
Belgium IFS 1997q1 2009q4 yes 52
Bolivia IFS 1997q1 2009q3 no 51
WEO, LAC 2009q4 2009q4 no 1
Brazil IFS 1997q1 2009q4 no 52
Bulgaria WEO, EE 1999q1 2001q4 no 12
IFS 2002q1 2009q4 no 32
Canada IFS 1997q1 2009q4 yes 52
Chile IFS 1999q1 2002q4 no 16
WEO, LAC 2003q1 2009q4 no 28
Colombia IFS 1999q1 1999q4 yes 4
IFS 2000q1 2009q4 yes 40
Costa Rica WEO, LAC 1999q1 1999q4 yes 4
IFS 2000q1 2009q4 no 40
Croatia IFS 1997q1 2009q4 no 52
Czech Republic IFS 1997q1 2009q4 no 52
Denmark IFS 1997q1 2009q4 no 52
Dom. Republic Central Bank 1997q1 2009q4 no 52
Ecuador IFS 1997q1 2007q3 yes 43
Central Bank 2007q4 2009q4 yes 9
Egypt WEO, MENA 1999q1 2001q4 yes 12
IFS 2001q1 2009q4 no 32
El Salvador WEO, LAC 1997q1 2005q4 yes 36
IFS 2006q1 2008q1 yes 9
WEO, LAC 2008q2q1 2009q4 yes 7
Finland IFS 1997q1 2009q4 no 52
France IFS 1997q1 2009q4 yes 52
(continued)
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Country Source from to SA obs.
Georgia WEO, CIS 1999q1 2002q4 yes 16
IFS 2003q1 2009q4 no 28
Germany IFS 1997q1 2009q4 yes 52
Greece WEO, Euro 1999q1 2000q4 yes 8
IFS 2001q1 2009q4 no 36
Guatemala WEO, LAC 1999q1 2000q4 no 8
Central Bank 2001q1 2009q4 yes 36
Hungary IFS 1997q1 2009q4 no 52
Iceland IFS 1997q1 2009q4 no 52
India WEO, country 1999q1 2006q4 no 32
IFS 2007q1 2009q4 no 12
Indonesia IFS 1997q1 2009q4 no 52
Iran IFS 1997q1 2007q4 no 44
WEO, Emerg. 2008q1 2009q4 no 8
Ireland IFS 1997q1 2009q4 no 52
Israel IFS 1997q1 2009q4 no 52
Italy IFS 1997q1 2009q4 yes 52
Japan IFS 1997q1 2009q4 yes 52
Jordan IFS 1997q1 2009q4 no 52
Luxembourg IFS 1997q1 2009q4 no 52
Mexico WEO, LAC 1999q1 2002q4 no 16
IFS 1997q1 2003q1 yes 28
Morocco WEO, MENA 1999q1 2004q4 yes 24
IFS 2005q1 2009q4 yes 20
Netherlands IFS 1997q1 2009q4 yes 52
Nicaragua WEO, LAC 1999q1 2002q4 no 16
Central Bank 2003q1 2009q4 no 28
Norway IFS 1997q1 2009q4 no 52
Panama WEO, LAC 1999q1 2003q2 yes 18
IFS 2003q3 2006q1 no 11
WEO, LAC 2006q2 2009q4 yes 15
Paraguay WEO, LAC 1999q1 2005q4 yes 28
IFS 2006q1 2008q3 no 11
WEO, LAC 2008q4 2009q4 yes 5
(continued)
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Country Source from to SA obs.
Peru IFS 1997q1 2009q4 no 52
Philippines IFS 1997q1 2009q4 no 52
Poland IFS 1997q1 2009q4 no 52
Portugal IFS 1997q1 2009q4 no 52
Romania IFS 1997q1 2009q4 no 52
Russia IFS 1997q1 2009q3 no 51
WEO, country 2009q4 2009q4 no 1
Slovakia IFS 1997q1 2009q4 no 52
Slovenia IFS 1997q1 2009q4 no 52
South Africa IFS 1997q1 2009q4 no 52
South Korea IFS 1997q1 2009q4 no 52
Sweden IFS 1997q1 2009q4 no 52
Switzerland IFS 1997q1 2009q4 yes 52
Turkey IFS 1997q1 2009q4 no 52
Tunisia WEO, MENA 1999q1 2000q4 yes 8
IFS 2001q1 2007q4 no 28
WEO, MENA 2008q1 2009q4 yes 8
Ukraine WEO, EE 1999q1 2000q4 no 8
IFS 2001q1 2009q4 yes 36
United Kingdom IFS 1997q1 2009q4 yes 52
Uruguay Central Bank 1997q1 2008q4 no 48
WEO, LAC 2009q1 2009q4 no 4
USA IFS 1997q1 2009q4 yes 52
Venezuela Central Bank 1997q1 2009q4 yes 52
Notes: SA describes whether the original series was seasonally adjusted.
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Table B.1: Robustness checks on the determinants of migration
Dependent variable: log of quarterly emigration rate
Specication Baseline No OECD No EU-15
Estimation methods FE CCE FE CCE FE CCE
Regressors Lags
Log real GDP per capita 1 -1.57 -1.57 -1.72 -1.59 -1.68 -1.72
[0.24]*** [0.29]*** [0.29]*** [0.35]*** [0.27]*** [0.33]***
2 -1.05 -0.46 -1.22 -0.17 -1.05 -0.43
[0.26]*** [0.29] [0.32]*** [0.34] [0.29]*** [0.33]
3 -0.93 -0.60 -0.54 -0.21 -1.05 -0.79
[0.27]*** [0.28]** [0.32]* [0.34] [0.30]*** [0.33]**
4 -1.18 -0.52 -1.17 -0.06 -1.42 -0.66
[0.26]*** [0.31]* [0.32]*** [0.32] [0.29]*** [0.36]*
GDP per capita, -4.74 -3.14 -4.65 -2.03 -5.20 -3.59
cumulated eect [0.37]*** [0.53]*** [0.49]*** [0.67]*** [0.43]*** [0.62]***
Visa requirement 0 -0.15 -1.34 -0.50 -1.32 -0.14 -1.34
[0.13] [0.30]*** [0.20]** [0.32]*** [0.15] [0.34]***
Other policy controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Quarter xed eects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Origin-year xed eects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2,776 2,776 1,504 1,504 2,120 2,120
Countries of origin 61 61 34 34 47 47
Frees' test 2.71 - 1.63 - 1.80 -
(p-value) (0.00) - (0.00) - (0.00) -
Wooldridge's test 32.64 - 18.86 - 22.17 -
(p-value) (0.00) - (0.00) - (0.00) -
Cross-sectional averages - 2.11 - 2.07 - 1.88
(p-value) - (0.00) - (0.00) - (0.00)
Notes: standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; observations are weighted by
population at origin; the baseline specication follows table 2; No OECD drops high-income OECD
countries; No EU-15 drops the members of the European Union before the 2004 enlargement.
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Dependent variable: log of quarterly emigration rate
Specication Lower GDP Working Age Male Working Age
Estimation methods FE CCE FE CCE FE CCE
Regressors Lags
Log real GDP per capita 1 -1.63 -1.51 -1.38 -1.32 -1.23 -0.92
[0.27]*** [0.33]*** [0.25]*** [0.29]*** [0.32]*** [0.39]**
2 -0.94 -0.05 -1.29 -0.54 -2.15 -0.75
[0.29]*** [0.32] [0.26]*** [0.29]* [0.33]*** [0.40]*
3 -0.83 -0.63 -1.04 -0.82 -0.30 0.08
[0.30]*** [0.32]** [0.27]*** [0.28]*** [0.34] [0.38]
4 -1.19 -0.10 -1.46 -0.57 -2.49 -1.62
[0.30]*** [0.36] [0.26]*** [0.31]* [0.32]*** [0.43]***
GDP per capita, -4.59 -2.29 -5.16 -3.25 -6.17 -3.21
cumulated eect [0.46]*** [0.63]*** [0.37]*** [0.53]*** [0.47]*** [0.72]***
Visa requirement 0 -0.14 -1.30 -0.11 -1.18 -0.09 -1.15
[0.15] [0.31]*** [0.13] [0.29]*** [0.17] [0.36]***
Other policy controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Quarter xed eects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Origin-year xed eects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,872 1,872 2,776 2,776 2,765 2,765
Countries of origin 42 42 61 61 61 61
Frees' test 1.88 - 2.87 - 2.77 -
(p-value) (0.00) - (0.00) - (0.00) -
Wooldridge's test 23.02 - 63.51 - 17.15 -
(p-value) (0.00) - (0.00) - (0.00) -
Cross-sectional averages - 1.95 - 2.20 - 2.06
(p-value) - (0.00) - (0.00) - (0.00)
Notes: standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; observations are weighted by
population at origin; specication Lower GDP drops all countries with a GDP per capita higher than
the Spanish one in PPP terms in 1999 ((World Bank, 2010)); specication Working Age computes
the dependent variable only on working age individuals (between 16 and 65) when they enter Spain;
specication Working Age Male further restricts the denition of the dependent variable to working
age males.
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